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SMALL STATE WITH A BIG TRADITION: NORWAY
CONTINUES WHALING AT THE EXPENSE OF
INTEGRATION AND NORDIC COOPERATION
Sonja Marta Halverson•
INTRODUCTION

Harvesting the minke whale has become a symbol of sovereignty
and cultural tradition to Norwegians. 1 Throughout whaling history,
Norwegians have hunted whales to the point of near-extinction, have
made technological discoveries that made whaling more humane, and
have promoted sustainable development to help whales recover from the
over-exploitation of centuries past. 2
Just as the history of whaling is intertwined with Norwegian
history, Norwegian history is deeply connected with the histories of
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and especially Sweden. 3 Because of their
common history, Norwegian whaling could put Sweden in a potentially
precarious position.
As Norway continues to whale despite
international opposition, Sweden must reconcile its anti-whaling policy
with its close relationship to Norway. For example, if Sweden publicly
supports the Norwegian whaling policy, Sweden could face criticism
from the United States and lose its reputation as an environmental
model.
Additionally, Norwegian whaling may disrupt the balance and
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1. See generally Brian Trevor Hodges, The Cracking Fa9ade of the International

Whaling Commission as an Institution of International Law: Norwegian Small-Type
Whaling and the Aboriginal Subsistence Exemption, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 295 (2000);
Martha Howton, International Regulation of Commercial Whaling: The Consequences of
Norway's Decision to Hunt the Minke Whale, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 175
(1994).
2. See generally Ray Gambell, The International Whaling Commission and the
Contemporary Whaling Debate, in CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF MARINE
MAMMALS 179 (John R. Twiss, Jr. & Randall R. Reeves eds., 1999).
3. Hilary Barnes, Nordic Togetherness: Let Us Count the Ways, 86 SCANDINAVIAN
REv. 68 (1998), available at 1998 WL 22014855; see Tor Dagre, The History of Norway,
http://odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/history/032005-990454/index-dokOOO-b-n-a.html
(last visited Jan. 11, 2004) (describing how Denmark relinquished Norway to Sweden after
the Napoleonic Wars, and how Norway then united with Sweden until Sweden granted
independence in 1905).
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cooperation in the Nordic region. The international community,
including the United States, has condemned Norway's whaling policy. 4
This opposition may lead to threats and sanctions against Norway,
which could affect the Nordic region as a whole. 5 If Norway continues
to apply sustainable development to its whaling policy and continues to
promote environmental protection, the subsequent legitimization of its
whaling practice might ease the tension in the Nordic region.
This Note has been separated into five parts. Part I summarizes the
history of whaling, details Norwegian contributions to the whaling
industry, and outlines the formation and transformation of the
International Whaling Commission. Part II discusses the legality of
Norwegian whaling, enforcement failures within the International
Whaling Commission, and exceptions to international law that legalize
Part III illustrates the negative effect of
Norwegian whaling.
Norwegian whaling on Norway's relationship with the European Union
and the potential effect that whaling could have on other Nordic
countries. Part IV examines the future of Norwegian whaling and
contemplates the possibility of Norway discontinuing its whaling
policy. Finally, Part V concludes with a prediction of the effect of
Norway's whaling on its foreign policy, focusing particularly on
Norway's relationship with Sweden.
I.

THE HISTORY OF WHALING AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A REGULATORY
REGIME

Boasting a whaling tradition that dates back to 800 A.D., Norway
has greatly influenced the whaling industry. 6 Norway played a
significant role in the advent of modem whaling when a Norwegian
named Svend Foyn invented the explosive grenade harpoon in 1864. 7
Prior to this invention, whalers were relegated to hunting slow-moving
whales close to the shore. 8 After the invention, whalers were able to
launch explosive grenade harpoons from cannons on ship decks,
providing opportunities to catch whales that lived further out in the

4. /FAW: Commercial Whaling at a Crossroads on Eve of /WC Meeting, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, June 10, 2003, available at 2003 WL 55658870.
5. Id.; see Howard Scott Schiffman, The Protection of Whales in International Law: A
Prospective for the Next Century, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 303, 308 (1996).
6. Nytt fra Norge for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian Minke Whaling,
http://odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/environment/032001-990108/index-dokOOO-b-na.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Ministry of Foreign Affairs].
7. Gambell, supra note 2, at 180.
8. See id.
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North Atlantic. 9 The invention of factory ships, which facilitated the
immediate processing of whales once they were caught, allowed
whalers to venture farther into the ocean in search of flourishing species
of whales. 10 Svend Foyn's invention of the explosive grenade harpoon
and the advent of factory ships greatly contributed to the depletion of
whale stocks in the North Atlantic. 11
The Formation of the International Whaling Commission

The over-exploitation of whale species in the North Atlantic
ultimately resulted in self-regulation of the whaling industry. During
the height of commercial whaling, whales were considered common
resources, and nations were disinclined to promote conservation
because whaling was a profitable venture. 12 Whalers recognized the
over-exploitation of many species of whales; however, instead of
halting commercial whaling, the whalers simply sought out new hunting
Norway realized that whale stocks were low and
grounds. 13
implemented a moratorium on whaling in Norwegian waters in 1903. 14
While the moratorium protected the whales in waters close to Norway,
the ban eventually inspired Norwegian whalers to search for new
hunting grounds. 15 In an effort to protect all species of whales, Norway
encouraged whaling nations to decrease whaling and implement a
licensing system. 16 This proposal eventually led to an attempt by the
whaling industry to regulate itself. 17 Norway and Great Britain,
accountable for ninety-five percent of the world's catch in the 1930s,
entered into an agreement that regulated their respective whaling
industries. 18 The Norwegian government subsequently proposed a
series of conferences to discuss the regulation of the whaling industry. 19
These conferences inspired the United States, an active participant in
the whaling industry, to initiate the International Convention for the
9. See Gambell, supra note 2, at 180.; see also Cliff M. Stein, Whales Swim for Their
Lives as Captain Ahab Returns in a Norwegian Uniform: An Analysis of Norway's Decision
to Resume Commercial Whaling, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 155, 160 (1994).
10. Gambell, supra note 2, at 180.
11. Id.
12. PETER J. STOETT, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF WHALING 6-8 (Univ. of British
Columbia 1997).
13. Stein, supra note 9, at 160.
14. Id.
15. Id.; see also Schiffman, supra note 5, at 308.
16. Schiffman, supra note 5, at 310.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 310-11; see also Gambell, supra note 2, at 181.
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Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) in 1946. 20
Pro-whaling nations convened at the ICRW to form limits and
regulations that would prevent continued exploitation of whale species.
The fifteen participants included the United States, Norway, Japan, and
Russia. 21 These nations worked together to establish the International
Whaling Commission (IWC), which "im~lement[ ed] both the economic
and environmental goals of the ICRW." 2 The preamble of the ICRW
stated that the purpose of the convention was to conserve whale stocks
in order for the whaling industry to continue operation. 23 The ICRW
produced two documents: the IWC Schedule and the IWC Convention.
The Schedule governed the conduct of whalers and set limits on the
amount of whales that could be harvested. 24 The catch limits created by
the Schedule were neither mandatory nor binding under the Convention
text. 25 Instead, the Convention expected the member nations to codify
the text into their own legal systems and enforce the limitations
individually. 26 While the IWC purported to conserve whale stocks, the
Convention did little to prevent whaling nations from over-exploiting
whale populations. 27
The Transformation of the International Whaling Commission

The failure of the ICRW to protect whale stocks and regulate the
whaling industry troubled non-member nations around the world as
several species of whales came dangerously close to extinction. 28 In an
effort to prevent the extinction of these whale srsecies, non-member
states began to apply for membership in the ICRW. 9 As the ICRW text
specifies, nations that afoee to adhere to the text of the ICRW will be
accepted into the IWC. 0 Subsequently, the number of IWC member

20. See Gambell, supra note 2, at 181 ; see also Schiffman, supra note 5, at 311.
21. Gambell, supra note 2, at 182-83. The original IWC member nations included:
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Peru, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. Id.
22. Stein, supra note 9, at 165.
23. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat.
1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72, available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/Convention.htm (last visited
Jan. 11, 2004) [hereinafter ICRW].
24. See Gambell, supra note 2, at 181.
25. See id. at 182.
26. See ICRW, supra note 23, art. IX; see also Gambell, supra note 2, at 183.
27. Gambell, supra note 2, at 183.
28. See id. at 184.
29. Id.
30. ICRW, supra note 23, art. X (4).
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nations grew from fifteen in 1946 to forty in 1998. 31 While the original,
pro-whaling members of the IWC originally sought to conserve and
maintain whale stocks, new members acted under the influence of the
growing environmental movements within their respective countries. 32
Most of the new members had "little or no direct" connection to
whaling, but were "concerned about the effects" of over-exploiting
whales. 33 As an increasing number of anti-whaling nations joined the
IWC, the purpose of the IWC shifted from conservation and sustainable
use of whales to complete preservation of every species of whale. 34
With the majority of the member nations now favoring an antiwhaling policy, the IWC began to implement reductions in catch
limits. 35 Even nations that had once engaged in commercial whaling
supported these drastic reductions. 36 To pass any new amendments to
the ICRW, including catch reductions, the ICRW text specifies that
there must be a three-fourths majority in favor of the proposed
amendment. 37 If not for the huge influx of anti-whaling nations into the
IWC, these reductions in catch limits would not have achieved the
requisite majority. 38 In 1982, a sufficient number of anti-whaling
nations had joined the IWC to tip a three-fourths majority in favor of
completely preserving whales. 39 The IWC subsequently implemented
more than just a reduction in catch limits; the IWC executed a complete
moratorium on commercial whaling. 40
The IWC's moratorium effectively distorted the purpose and spirit
of the ICRW. 41 The original purpose of the ICRW was clear: to
conserve whale stocks for future generations of whalers. 42 Instead of
continuing to reduce whale quotas in order to conserve whale stocks,
the new anti-whaling majority embraced the idea that the practice of
whaling should be terminated completely. 43 In fact, the IWC was

31. Gambell, supra note 2, at 182-83.
32. Hodges, supra note 1, at 301-02.
33. Gambell, supra note 2, at 184.
34. See Hodges, supra note 1, at 304.
35. Gambell, supra note 2, at 184.
36. Id.
37. ICRW, supra note 23, art. III (2).
38. Gambell, supra note 2, at 184.
39. Howton, supra note 1, at 177-78.
40. Id.
41. Jon L. Jacobson, Whales, the /WC, and the Rule of Law, in TOWARD A
SUSTAINABLE WHALING REGIME 81-82 (Robert L. Friedheim ed., 2001).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 82.
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criticized for misinterpreting its own treaty and for manipulating and
politicizing an otherwise valid purpose of whale conservation. 44 The
anti-whaling majority adopted this moratorium with little authority
under the ICRW, and then criticized the pro-whaling minority that
opposed the moratorium. 45
The moratorium on whalinf marked one of the most significant
events in the history of whaling. 4 The moratorium reduced catch limits
to zero, but the actual reduction extended over a three-year period to
give whaling nations time to phase out their commercial whaling
industries. 47 Norway and six other countries immediately lodged a
formal objection. 48 In vigorous opposition to the moratorium, both
Japan and Norway pledged to continue whaling. 49 The Commission
could do nothing to stop the two countries from continuing their
whaling practices since it had no power to enforce the ban on whaling. 50
The moratorium on commercial whaling marked the end of an era:
nations no longer viewed oceans as common property to be exploited,
and the act of whale hunting emerged as an immoral and unethical
practice.
II. NORWAY'S DECISION TO RESUME WHALING
Although Norway lodged a formal objection to the moratorium, the
country voluntarily halted whaling activities pending the research
results of the IWC's Scientific Committee. 51 The Committee estimated
that roughly 112,000 minke whales inhabited the Northeast Atlantic and
72,000 minke whales inhabited the central Atlantic. 52 Despite available
scientific evidence showing minke whales could withstand limited
whaling, the Scientific Committee effectively extended the moratorium

44. See Jacobson, supra note 41, at 98.
45. See id. at 82.
46. Stein, supra note 9, at 167.
47. Id. at 168; Adrienne M. Ruffle, Resurrecting the International Whaling
Commission: Suggestions to Strengthen the Conservation Effort, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 639,
650-651 (2002); International Whaling Commission, Commercial Whaling Catch Limits,
http://www.iwcoffice.org/Catches.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2004) [hereinafter International
Whaling Commission].
48. International Whaling Commission, supra note 47.
49. Stein, supra note 9, at 168. Japan subsequently withdrew its formal objection to the
moratorium in 1985. Id. Believing that the formal objection would lead to conflict with the
Soviet Union, Japan ceased all commercial whaling in 1988. Id.
50. International Whaling Commission, supra note 47.
51. Gambell, supra note 2, at 190.
52. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 6.
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by refusing to reevaluate it based on the available scientific evidence. 53
As a result of the extended ban on whaling, Iceland withdrew from the
IWC in 1992. 54 Norway remained a member of the IWC; however, the
Scientific Committee's decision ultimately fueled .the Norwegian
government's decision to resume whaling. 55 In 1992, Norway argued
that if the number of minke whale stocks reported by the IWC's
Scientific Committee was accurate, then the minke whale species could
withstand limited whaling. 56 After specifying whaling procedures and
implementing a strict permit-based system, Norwegian coastal whalers
resumed their whaling tradition in 1993. 57
Norway's decision to resume whaling enraged the international
community. 58 Within the IWC, the anti-whaling nations condemned
Norway's decision to defy the new spirit of the ICRW. 59 Shortly after
Norway made the announcement, fifteen members of the IWC signed a
statement encouraging Norway to reconsider its decision to resume
whaling. 6 Furthermore, the international community "threatened...
economic boycotts, blockage of its [Norway's] bid to join the European
Community, and boycotts of the 1994 winter Olympics to be held in
Lillehammer."61 Nevertheless, Norway upheld its decision to resume
whaling and maintained that its whaling policy complied with
international law. 62

°

Norwegian Whaling: A Violation ofInternational Law?

There are three legitimate foundations upon which Norway may
argue that its decision to resume whaling complies with international
law. First, the IWC has no enforcement mechanism to legally bind

53. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 6.
54. Gambell, supra note 2, at 190.
55. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 6.
56. Judith Berger-Eforo, Note, Sanctuary for the Whales: Will This Be the Demise of
the International Whaling Commission or a Viable Strategy for the Twenty-First Century?,
8 PACEINT'LL. REV. 439, 465 (1996).
57. Christine Ingebritsen, Europeanization and Cultural Identity: Two Worlds of EcoCapitalism, 73 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. 6376, 6380 (2001), available at 2001 WL 24253102
[hereinafter Ingebritsen, European and Cultural Identity]; Stein, supra note 9, at 170;
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 6.
58. Stein, supra note 9, at 156.
59. See Howton, supra note 1, at 182.
60. Stein, supra note 9, at 170.
61. David D. Caron, The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic
Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risk of Coercion in Consensual Structures,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 154, 166 (1995).
62. Id.; Ingebritsen, European and Cultural Identity, supra note 57.
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Norway to the moratorium. 63 Second, Norway's decision to resume
whaling has not violated relevant international treaties. 64 Third, the
continuation of Norwegian whaling has not violated customary
international law.
The International Whaling Commission Lacks Enforcement Power

When the pro-whaling nations formed the IWC, the parties did not
contemplate the necessity for an enforcement mechanism and, therefore,
did not include one in the text. Consequently, the IWC cannot penalize
Norway for continuing to harvest minke whales in the absence of such a
mechanism. 65 In fact, the IWC has no power to enforce any of its
restrictions. Instead of creating an institution of legal enforcement, the
whaling nations that formed the IWC created "normative institution"
that can only apply lressure to encourage member nations to comply
with its regulations. 6
In an attempt to substitute for the missing enforcement mechanism
in the IWC, the United States legislature enacted two amendments that
have the potential to punish nations that contravene or violate
international conventions. 67 The Pelly Amendment, enacted in 1971,
authorizes the U.S. Secretary of Commerce to advise the President
when a nation acts to "diminish the effectiveness" of any international
fishery conservation agreement, such as the ICRW. 68 If a nation
continues whaling in violation of the ICRW, the Secretary can certify
that nation and impose a trade embargo on the importation of that
nation's products. 69 The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment is narrower
in scope than the Pelly Amendment. Enacted in 1979, the PackwoodMagnuson Amendment operates under the same certification process as

63. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 6.
64. Id.
65 . Dylan A. MacLeod, International Consequences of Norway 's Decision to Allow the
Resumption of Limited Commercial Whaling, 6 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 131 , 132-33 (1994).
66. Hodges, supra note 1, at 323.
67. See generally Melinda K. Blatt, Woe For the Whales: Japan Whaling Association v.
American Cetacean Society, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986) , 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1285 (1987);
Schiffman, supra note 5, at 316; Gambell, supra note 2, at 183.
68. Fisherman's Protective Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1982) [hereinafter Pelly
Amendment]; Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT: An
Analysis of the Pelly Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L.
& PoL'Y 751, 759 (1994); James Brennan & Gene S. Martin, Jr., Enforcing the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling: the Pelly and PackwoodMagnuson Amendments, 17 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 293, 294 (1989); Blatt, supra note
67, at 1285.
69. Gambell, supra note 2, at 183.
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the Pelly Amendment. However, under the Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce can certify a nation that
specifically violates the ICRW. 70 When the Secretary certifies a nation
under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, that nation's share of
fishing in U.S. waters is drastically reduced. 71
Although Norway has been certified several times, the U.S. has
refrained from imposing the sanctions authorized by the Pelly and
Packwood-Magnuson Amendments. 72 In 1992, President Bush found
that Norway's plan to resume whaling in violation of the IWC's
moratorium warranted the drastic punishments permitted by the Pelly
and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, yet he chose not to impose
sanctions. 73 One author argues that President Bush refrained from
imposing sanctions because he did not want to hurt the trade
relationship between Norway and the United States. 74 When the U.S.
Secretary of Commerce certified Norway under the Pelly and
Packwood-Magnuson amendments again in 1993, President Clinton
reluctantly chose to refrain from imposing sanctions in light of
Norway's commitment to protect the environment. 75 Later that year,
Norway further redeemed itself through its involvement in negotiating a
peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation
Organization. 76 These instances of Norway's certification without the
imposition of sanctions demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the
amendments as enforcement mechanisms for the IWC. 77
Even ifthe U.S. imposed sanctions on Norway as a punishment for

70. Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1982); Gambell, supra note
2, at 183; Brennan & Martin, supra note 68, at 294; Blatt, supra note 67, at 1285.
71. Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, supra note 70; Gambell, supra note 2, at 183;
Brennan & Martin, supra note 68, at 294.
72. See Stein, supra note 9, at 173-78.
73. Sarah Suhre, Misguided Morality: The Repercussions of the International Whaling
Commission's Shift from a Policy of Regulation to Preservation, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 305, 318 (1999).
74. Stein, supra note 9, at 175.
75. See id. at 176.
76. Stein, supra note 9, at 177. In 1993, Norway acted as a channel between the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel. Helge Blakkisrud, Norwegian
in
the
20th
Century,
at
Foreign
Policy
http://odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/foreign/032001-990092/index-dokOOO-b-f-a.html
(May 2000) (last visited Jan. 11, 2004). Norwegian efforts in encouraging Israeli and
Palestinian leaders to sign the Oslo Accord have been considered a "breakthrough in
international conflict management." Id.
77. See David S. Lessof, Jonah Swallows the Whale: An Examination of American and
International Failures to Adequately Protect Whales from Impending Extinction, 11 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 413, 423-24 (1996).
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continuing whaling, the U.S. would arguably be acting in contravention
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 78 One of the
main ob~ectives of GATT is the elimination of trade barriers between
nations. 9 Narrow exceptions to GATT authorize a country to
implement restrictions on imrorts to further the protection of
"exhaustible natural resources." 8 However, GATT does not contain an
exception that would allow the United States to utilize a general ban on
imports from Norway as retribution for Norway's whaling policy. 81
Unlike GATT, UNCLOS does not regulate trade; UNCLOS does,
however, regulate nearly all aspects of the law of the sea and precludes
the use of unilateral trade barriers. 82 Therefore, if the United States
imposed the sanctions authorized by the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments on Norway, the United States would arguably be in
violation of international law. 83
Another basis exists that could prevent the imposition of sanctions
under the Pelly Amendment and Packwood-Magnuson Amendment.
Technically, Norway has not violated the ICRW by continuing to
promote whaling. The ICRW contains an "opt-out" clause that allows a
nation to object to an IWC regulation. 84 Once a nation files a formal
objection, the IWC cannot make that regulation binding upon the
objecting nation. 85 When the IWC implemented the moratorium on
whaling in 1982, Norway immediately objected under the "opt-out"
78. Schiffman, supra note 5, at 334.
79. Clay Erik Hawes, Norwegian Whaling and the Pelly Amendment: A Misguided
Attempt at Conservation, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 97, 118 (1994); General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.l.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT] GATT is directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade
and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce. Id.
80. GATT, supra note 79, art. XX(g); see Ted L. Dorman, The GAIT Consistency of
U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save the Whales, Dolphins, and
Turtles, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 477, 512 (1991).
81. Dorman, supra note 80.
82. Schiffman, supra note 5, at 334.
83. See Richard J. MacLaughlin, UNCLOS and the Demise of the United States' Use of
Trade Sanctions to Protect Dolphins, Sea Turtles, Whales, and Other International Marine
Living Resources, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 20 (1994). The United States, however, is not yet a
party to UNCLOS. Id. While the United States government may not want to implement
sanctions for the reasons outlined above, American voters may be able to convince the
government otherwise. Id. A recent United States poll shows that 80 per cent of voters are
opposed to Norway's commercial whaling and would like President Bush to commence
action. U.S. Newswire, New National Poll Shows U.S. Voters Strongly Against Commercial
Whaling, June 17, 2003, available at 2003 WL 55658950.
84. MacLeod, supra note 65, at 135.
85. Id.
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clause of the ICRW. 86 Norwegian whaling thus complies with the
ICRW. 87 However, the fact that Norwegian whaling does not violate
the text of the IWC has not convinced IWC member-states that
Norwegian whaling is legal. Armed with only a meager United Statessponsored enforcement mechanism and the chance that the United
States may not impose sanctions, the IWC member-states must resort to
exerting pressure on Norway to change its whaling policy.
Regulation of Whaling Through International Treaties
While Norway's whaling practice does not violate the ICRW, other
international bodies regulate aspects of the whaling industry. UNCLOS
and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) regulate various areas relating to
whaling; however, Norway has not violated either of these treaties by
continuing to hunt whales. 88 Under UNCLOS, coastal states are
permitted to regulate up to 200 nautical miles of Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) that extend out from their coastal borders. 89 Under Article
61 of UN CLOS, a state must set limits, based on scientific evidence, as
to the amount of resources that can be exploited within that state's
EEZ. 90 This means that pro-whaling nations like Norway may choose
to allow whaling in their EEZs, provided that the nation has set catch
limits based on scientific research. 91 Since Norway bases its minke
whale catch limits on scientific evidence and sustainable development,
Norway's whaling complies with UNCLOS. 92
Furthermore, Norway's whaling policy conforms to CITES, which
regulates international trade of endangered species. In 1983, the minke
whale appeared in CITES Appendix I, which offers the highest amount
of protection to endangered species. 93 Norway entered an objection to
this classification of the minke whale based on scientific evidence and
petitioned to change the minke whale's status from an Appendix I to an

86. MacLeod, supra note 65, at 135.
87. Id. at 138.
88. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Export of Norwegian Whale Products, at
http://odin.dep.no/ud/engelsk/p2500832/p30003926/index-b-n-a.html (last visited Jan. 11,
2004) [hereinafter Export of Norwegian Whale Products].
89. Schiffman, supra note 5, at 327; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994)
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
90. Schiffman, supra note 5, at 349; UNCLOS, supra note 89, art. 61.
91. Schiffman, supra note 5, at 349.
92. Id.
93. Export of Norwegian Whale Products, supra note 88.
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Appendix II species. 94 If CITES moved the minke whale to the
Appendix II list, Norway and other whaling nations would be permitted
to trade minke whales commercially. 95
In 1995, CITES changed the criteria it used to determine which
Appendix a species of flora or fauna would fall. While the new criteria
attempted to eliminate the politicization surrounding several
classifications of species, the criteria did not reclassify the minke whale
to an Appendix II species. 96 Despite the unchanged status of the minke
whale in CITES, Norway has not violated CITES because the
convention contains an "opt-out" clause similar to that in the ICRW
text. 97 Since Norway lodged a formal objection to the trade regulations
in CITES that prohibit the international trade of whales, Norway is not
legally bound to follow CITES regulations. 98
In 2001, the Norwegian government lifted a self-imposed ban on
the trade of whale products in an effort to engage in the international
trade of minke whales. 99 The Norwegian government began to issue
export licenses and authorized limited commercial export of whale
products to Japan and Iceland. 100 Along with implementing a licensing
program, the Norwegian government has mandated that each country
importing whales from Norway institute a genetic databank to ensure
that imported whale products do not consist of highly-endangered whale
species. 101 Coastal whaling communities finally pressured the

94. See Kevin Eldridge, Whale for Sale?: New Developments in the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 24 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 549, 551-58 (1995).
95. Id. at 550-51.
96. Id.
97. PETERH. SAND, TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 155 (1999); Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 13, 1973, 27
U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
98. SAND, supra note 97, at 155.
99. Fiskeridepartementet (Ministry of Fisheries), Export of Norwegian Minke Whale
Products, at http://odin.dep.no/fid/engelsk/008041-070038/index-dokOOO-b-f-a.html (Jan.
16, 2001) (last visited Jan. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Minke Whale Products]; Walter Gibbs,
Norwegians, Defying Protests, Will Sell Blubber to Japan, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2001, at
A6; Agence France-Presse, Japan Negotiating To Buy Whalemeat From Norway, July 30,
2002, available at 2002 WL 23569285.
100. Minke Whale Products, supra note 99; Gibbs, supra note 99. Iceland has decided
to import minke whale products from Norway until it resumes whaling, which is scheduled
for the 2006 season. Anthony Browne, Whale Trade Back in Business, TIMES (London),
July 29, 2002, at 13; Whaling Nations Say Foes Have Lost !WC Credibility, SAIGON TIMES
DAILY, Feb. 13, 2003, available at 2003 WL 4469133.
101. Agence France-Presse, Japan Negotiating to Buy Whalemeat From Norway, July
30, 2002, available at 2002 WL 23569285; Kristin Kovner et al., The Battle Isn't Over;
Whaling Nations Want to Restart the Hunt, NEWSWEEK INT'L, July 14, 2003, available at
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Norwegian government to permit the exportation of whale products
when coastal whalers could no longer afford storage costs for the
thousands of pounds of whale blubber that Norwegians refused to eat. 102
Although the Norwegian government authorized the trade of whale
products, the whaling industry has suffered several major setbacks since
its recent inception. For example, when Norway announced the
intention to trade minke whale blubber to Japan, international airlines
boycotted and refused to carry the whale products. 103 As a result of the
boycott, Norwegian whalers scarcely managed to send Japan a few
samples of the whale blubber. 104 Norwegians have continued their
attempts to ship whale products to Japan. However, recent studies have
shown that North Atlantic whale products contain high levels of
mercury, prompting Japan to reject recent Norwegian proposals for
exporting whale products. 105
Norway's continued attempts to trade minke whale products to
both Japan and Iceland appears to be in direct contravention of CITES.
However, Norway has not violated CITES because Norway filed a
formal objection to the Appendix I minke whale status. 106 Furthermore,
Norway has not violated UNCLOS by continuing to allow Norwegian
whalers to hunt within Norway's EEZ. 107 Therefore, Norway has not
violated relevant international treaties by continuing to hunt and trade
minke whales.

Whaling and Customary International Law
While Norwegian whaling may not violate UNCLOS or CITES,
many anti-whaling organizations argue that whaling violates customary
international law. 108 The International Court of Justice has defined
customary international law as consistent state practice out of a sense of

2003 WL 8873651.
102. Whalers Bring Home Blubber That's No Bacon, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2000, at
B9; Charles Goldsmith, Norwegian Buyer Is Stuck With Tons of Blubber Nearing Sell-By
Date, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 10, 2002, at Al.
103. Norwegian Whale Cargo Rebuffed by Airlines, SEATTLE TIMES, July 18, 2001, at
A2; Browne, supra note 100.
104. Browne, supra note 100.
105. U.S. Newswire, Norwegian Whale Hunt to Proceed Despite Contamination, Says
International Fund for Animal Welfare, Sept. 23, 2003, available at 2003 WL 55662556;
Agence France-Presse, Norway Warns Pregnant Women Against Eating Whale Meat, May
13, 2003, available at 2003 WL 2801497.
106. Eldridge, supra note 94, at 550-51.
107. See Schiffman, supra note 5, at 349.
108. Id.
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"legal obligation." 109 Arguably, the preservation of whales has risen to
the level of customary international law, as evidenced by a majority of
nations that have condemned whaling and have acted accordingly by
joining the whale-related treaties listed above. 110 However, not all
nations have consistently supported the preservation of whales. 111 For
instance, the United States has continually condemned whaling through
the IWC, yet has allowed limited whaling by aboriginal tribes living in
the United States. 112 This inconsistency tends to show that whale
preservation has not yet become international custom. 113
Norway has fought to keep the preservation of whales from
becoming international custom. 114 For whale-related treaties that antiwhaling nations have signed to protect whales, Norway has entered
objections and reservations to the provisions of each treaty that attempt
to regulate the whaling industry. 115 Under international law, a nation
that persistently objects to a custom will not be bound by that custom. 116
Norway's persistent objections to the IWC's moratorium on whaling
mean that Norway can legally violate the moratorium. 117 Therefore,
even if the preservation of whales has become customary international
law, Norway's persistent objections exempt Norway from these
obligations. Although anti-whaling nations may claim that Norway has
not complied with international law, Norway has not violated the
ICRW, UNCLOS, CITES, or customary international law. While
Norwegian whaling may be legal under international law, the decision
to continue whaling may negatively affect Norway's further relations
with the rest of Europe and the other Nordic countries. 118

109. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 19691.C.J. 3, para.
77; MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 (3d ed. 1999).
110. Schiffman, supra note 5, at 324.
111. Id. at 329-30.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 330-31.
114. See Schiffman, supra note 5, at 331.
115. See Eldridge, supra note 94, at 550-551; Hodges, supra note 1, at 303, 315;
Schiffman, supra note 5, at 318.
116. Schiffman, supra note 5, at 331-32.
117. Id. at318.
118. Howton, supra note 1, at 182; Valeria Neale Spencer, Domestic Enforcement of
International Law: The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 2 Cow. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 109, 113 (1991); Hodges, supra note 1, at 299; Schiffman, supra
note 5, at 331.
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III. THE EFFECT OF NORWAY'S WHALING ON NORWEGIAN FOREIGN
POLICY

Despite the fact that Norwegian whaling complies with
international law, Norway will confront continued opposition to its
whaling industry. Norwegians have shown no signs of relinquishing
their whaling policy because, along with fishing and the protection of
the environment, whaling is part of the Norwegian culture and
identity. 119 This culture and identity has played a large role in
Norwegian foreign policy, especially with regard to the E.U. 120
Norwegian foreign policy vacillates between an "outward-looking
tendency and a more introverted isolationist impulse." 121 Norwegians
desire the benefits of integrating with Europe, but are skeptical of
joining any organization that would force Norway to become bound by
international agreements. 122 For example, while Norway depends on
trade with the E.U., Norwegians have proven that they value their
culture and identity more than they value integration into a tariff-free
economy. 123 Norway has negotiated integration with the E.U. several
times; however, Norwegians have ultimately rejected integration each
time fearing that Norwegian identity would be replaced with a neutral,
undistinguishable identity. 124
Norwegian Isolationism
Despite common policies and identities, Norway's path to
integration diverged from that of Sweden, Denmark, and Finland. One
reason for this divergence is the fact that Norway did not regain
independence until 1905, after nearly 600 years of union with Sweden
and Denmark. 125 When Norway finally became independent, the
country was ill-prepared to handle the security issues that evolved over
the course of the next century.
Norway's experience in World War II forced the government to
look to foreign powers for security protection. During World War II,

119. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 5; Alexander Gillespie, The Ethical
Question in the Whaling Debate, 9 GEO. lNT'L ENVTL L. REV. 355, 374 (1997).
120. Nytt fra Norge for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Globalization and Norwegian
Identity, available at http://odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/history/032005-9904 71 /indexdokOOO-b-n-a.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2004).
121. Blakkisrud, supra note 76.
122. Id.
123. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 6.
124. See Blakkisrud, supra note 76.
125. Id.
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Nazi occupation threatened Norwegian culture and values. 126 Norway's
attempt to remain neutral like Sweden failed miserably. 127 The threats
on Norwegian security forced the country to seek protection from the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NAT0). 128 Norway relied on the
involvement of the U.S. in NATO, especially since the U.S. had
emerged as the new superpower after World War II. 129 However,
Norway did not accept NATO protection unconditionally. Just as
Norway entered objections and reservations to the conventions
regulating whaling to protect its sovereignty, Norway also entered
several reservations upon joining NAT0. 130
Unwilling to relinquish more sovereignty than necessary, Norway
conditioned its participation in NAT0. 131 Norway refused to permit
access to Norwegian bases unless Norway was under attack and
declined to allow NATO to deploy any nuclear weapons from
Norwegian soil. 132 The threats to Norwegian security during World
War II and the Cold War, coupled with the fear that the country would
become more marginalized, encouraged Norway to seek cooperation
with the rest of Europe. 133
As Norway recovered from World War II and the Cold War,
security became less of an issue, and Norway focused more on
European trade.
Norway remained reluctant to marginalize its
sovereignty and identity; however, the nation became heavily reliant on
trade with the rest of Europe and subsequently joined several European
economic organizations to take advantage of the tariff-free market in
Europe. For example, Norway entered into the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) in 1961. 134 When the E.U. established its internal
market in 1992, the members of EFTA and the E.U. negotiated the
establishment of the European Economic Area (EEA). 135 Norway also
became dedicated to several regional organizations, including the
126. Lawrence Watters, Indigenous Peoples and the Environment: Convergence from a
Nordic Perspective, 20 UCLA J. ENVT'L L. & POL'Y, 237, 253 (2001/2002).
127. Pertti Pesonen et al., The Three Nations of Northern Europe, in To JOIN OR NOT
TO JOIN: THREE NORDIC REFERENDUMS ON MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 46 (Anders
Todal Jenssen et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Three Nations of Northern Europe].
128. Blakkisrud, supra note 76.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Clive Archer, Norway: The One that Got Away, in THE 1995 ENLARGEMENT OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION 147 (John Redmon ed., 1997).
134. Blakkisrud, supra note 76.
135. Id.
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Barents Cooperation, the Baltic Sea Council, and the Arctic Council. 136
These organizations helped to maintain security and promote trade
throughout the region. 137
Although Norway has remained active in the EEA and regional
organizations, Norwegians have refused to give up sovereignty and
identity by completely integrating into the E.U. Norway has a
complicated history of accepting and rejecting European integration. 138
The Norwegian government first sought membership in the European
Community in the 1960s. 139 However, when the government held a
referendum in 1972, Norwegians voted against membership. 140 The
vote reflected the divide between the small, coastal villages in Norway
that fought to maintain their cultural traditions and the large cities that
sought to increase free trade with the rest of Europe. 141 The ability of
Norway to make sovereign decisions became a focal point for the antiEuropean campaign. 142 Norwegians feared that a remote entity like the
European Community would try to govern Norway in a manner that was
inconsistent with Norwegian ideals and traditions. 143
Norway negotiated membership into the E.U. for a second time in
the early 1990s. At the time, joining the E.U. seemed like the next
logical step for Norway after having taken advantage of the internal
market through the EEA. 144 Plus, Norway had been operating at a
disadvantage within the EEA; Norway could participate in the early
stages of policy development but could not participate in the final
decision and had to implement that final decision into Norwegian
law. 145 Norway also felt pressured by its Nordic neighbors to join the
E.U. Denmark acceded into the E.U. in 1972, and Sweden and Finland
began negotiating their membership in the early 1990s. 146

136. Blakkisrud, supra note 76; Ingeborg Grimsmo, Norway's Environmental Policies
in
an
International
Perspective,
available
at
http://odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norwayI environment/03 2091-991564/index-dokOOO-b-fa.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2004).
137. Blakkisrud, supra note 76.
138. See Pertti Pesonen et al., To Join or Not to Join, in To JOIN OR NOT TO JOIN:
THREE NORDIC REFERENDUMS ON MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Anders Todal
Jenssen et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter To Join or Not to Join].
139. Id. at 20.
140. Id.
141. Archer, supra note 133, at 148.
142. Id. at 155.
143. Id.
144. Blakkisrud, supra note 76.
145. Ingebritsen, European & Cultural Identity, supra note 57.
146. Pacsal
Fontaine,
Europe
in
Ten
Points,
available
at

Published by SURFACE, 2004

17

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 31, No. 1 [2004], Art. 9

138

Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com.

[VoI. 3 1: 121

Although membership seemed inevitable, Norway rejected
European integration in 1994 due to several obstacles that Norwegians
could not overcome. These obstacles involved the regulation of fishing
and oil. If Norway had accepted European integration, the count~
would have lost the right to regulate fishing in Norwegian waters. 1 7
For example, the E.U. would have regulated Norwegian coastal waters
and opened these waters for exploitation by other E.U. members. 148 The
fisheries policy of the E. U. had a reputation for allowing overexploitation of marine resources. 149 Also, Norwegian oil production
that created wealth for Norwegians would have been collectivized by
the E.U. Thus, Norwegian oil would have become a commodity
available to all E.U. members. 150 In fact, Norwegians felt so strongly
about maintaining their sovereignty over oil that when a document
surfaced during the E.U. campaign revealing the fact that Norwegian oil
would become a community resource, the pro-E.U. campaign knew it
had lost the referendum. 151 In sum, the E.U. challenged Norway's
sovereignty over oil and fishing regulation, and Norway's traditional
management of these natural resources. 152
Like the regulation of oil and fish, European integration would
have also impinged upon Norway's sovereign right to harvest whales.
Norway's decision to resume whaling in 1993 posed a significant
problem for the E.U. because the E.U. was an anti-whaling
organization. 153 However, the E.U. offered the following compromise
to facilitate negotiations: Norway would be allowed to continue hunting
minke whales for two years, after which time the policy would be
reviewed. 154 The compromise satisfied neither the Norwegians nor the
anti-whaling nations within the E.U. 155 Despite negotiations with the
E.U., the 1994 referendum rejecting European integration demonstrated
that the Norwegian people clearly did not want to relinquish Norway's
sovereignty or ability to regulate fishing, oil production, and whaling. 156
http://europa.eu.int/comm/publications/booklets/eu_glance/12/txt_en.htm#l (last visited
Jan. 11, 2004).
147. Archer, supra note 133, at 153.
148. Id.
149. Ingebritsen, European & Cultural Identity, supra note 57.
150. Archer, supra note 133, at 153.
151. Id.
152. Ingebritsen, European & Cultural Identity, supra note 57.
153. STANLEY P. JOHNSON & GUY CORCELLE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 11 (2d ed. 1995); STOETT, supra note 12, at 90.
154. Caron, supra note 61, at 167.
155. Id.
156. To Join or Not to Join, supra note 138.
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Just as Norway rejected E.U. membership, Sweden and Finland,
both approved accession into the E.U. 157 One explanation for the
diverging integration policies could be that Sweden and Finland faced a
certain urgency to join as their respective economies headed toward
recessions and increased unemployment. 158 The Norwegian economy,
on the other hand, flourished from the production of oil off the
Norwegian coast and did not face the same high unemployment as
Sweden and Finland. 159 Therefore, Norway could risk non-membership
to protect the nation's sovereignty and cultural traditions.
Even though Norway rejected membership, the Norwegian
government understood that Norway could no longer operate without
cooperation with the E.U. For example, Norway continues to rely on
bilateral trade agreements with the E.U. today. 160 However, by refusing
membership in the E.U., Norway now relies on cooperation with the
E.U. but does not have a voice to affect policies within the organization.
Norwegian influence on policies within the E.U. is limited to Norway's
contact and communication with other member states. 161
Despite Norway's continued cooperation with the E.U., Norway
still practices isolationism to protect the right to whale and preserve
Norwegian coastal waters from over-exploitation. 162
Norwegians
continue to believe that they made the right decision by rejecting E.U.
membership, especially because the nation continues to prosper without
the help of the E.U. 163 Unaffected by this isolationism, Norway
continues to hold sacrosanct its sovereignty and right of selfdetermination.164

157. To Join or Not to Join, supra note 138, at 20.
158. G. Porter Elliott, Neutrality, the Acquis Communautaire and the European

Union's Search for a Common Foreign and Security Policy under Title IV of the Maastricht
Treaty: The Accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 601,
624 (1996); To Join or Not to Join, supra note 138; Matthew H. Wexley, Note, The Impact
of Sweden's Accession into the European Union on its Social and Labor Policies, 4
CARDOZO J. lNT'L & COMP. L. 189, 190 (1996); Lars Svasand, The Re-Emergence of the EU
Issue in Norwegian Politics, 74 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. 329 (2002), available at 2002 WL
23105681.
159. Svasand, supra note 158.
160. Blakkisrud, supra note 76.
161. Id.
162. Stephen D. Moore, No Surprise? Norway Weighs Assets in Economy, Defense
Against EU Benefits, WALL ST. J. EUR., Nov. 28, 1994, at 1.
163. Archer, supra note 133, at 153.
164. Hodges, supra note 1, at 317.
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Norway and Sweden: A History of Cooperation
Although Norway may be isolated from the rest of Europe,
Norway's relationship with Sweden will prevent Norway from complete
isolation. Based on a shared history and similar approaches to culture
and the environment, the two countries benefit from an enviable level of
cooperation.1 65 Because of this deep-rooted cooperation, Norwegian
whaling could have a negative impact on Sweden. For example, despite
their small size, both Sweden and Norway are model environmental
Sweden maintains a reputation as an environmental
nations. 166
powerhouse and continues to be influential on a global scale. 167
Although Norway also has a reputation for stringent environmental
policies, its credibility as an environmentally conscious nation is
undermined by its whaling policy. 168 Similarly, Sweden's
environmental reputation and status as a model nation will be negatively
affected if Sweden supports Norwegian whaling. However, if Sweden
adamantly opposes Norwegian whaling, the cooperation between the
two countries could dissolve.
Norway: A Model State Gone Bad?
Despite the small physical size of their respective countries, both
Norway and Sweden have influenced environmental policies far beyond
Scandinavia. 169 Understanding that environmental problems ignore
state boundaries, Norway and Sweden have contributed their "limited
power and resources" to the resolution of both national and global
environmental problemsY0 Through their contributions, Norway and
Sweden have been elevated to the status of environmental model
nations. 171 One example of a contribution by Norway and Sweden to a

165. Ola
Tunander,
Nordic
Cooperation,
http://odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/foreign/032005-990418/index-dokOOO-b-f-a.html
(last updated Feb. 4, 1999) (last visited Jan. 11, 2004 ).
166. See generally Grimsmo, supra note 132; Detlef Jahn, The Social Paradigms of
Environmental Performance: The Nordic Countries in an International Perspective, in THE
NORDIC ENVIRONMENTS: COMPARING POLITICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND POLICY ASPECTS
111 (Marko Joas et al. eds., 1999).
167. Jahn, supra note 166.
168. Id.; see generally Grimsmo, supra note 136.
169. See generally Anna Kronsell, Can Small States Influence EU Norms? Insights
from Sweden 's Participation in the Field of Environmental Politics, 74 SCANDINAVIAN
STUD. 287 (2002), available at 2002 WL 23105679; Christine lngebritsen, The
Scandinavian Way and its Legacy in Europe, 74 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. 255 (2002), available
at 2002 WL 23105677 [hereinafter Ingebritsen, The Scandinavian Way}.
170. See Kronsell, supra note 169.
171. See generally Grimsmo, supra note 136.
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global environmental policy involved the formation of a joint fund to
aid environmental projects in Asia. 172 In addition, the Swedish
Parliament has tried to set an example by adopting idealistic
environmental goals that should be resolved within one generation. 173
These goals involve cooperation on the public, private, and non-profit
level, as well as objectives such as improving air and water quality, and
ensuring that marine life in bodies of water flourish. 174 Sweden further
proved its influence at the international level when Swedish policy
makers initiated and hosted the first United Nations conference on the
environment. 175
Norway has similarly been influential as a global environmental
model. 176 Norway's source of power in the environmental field began
with Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, who made 'sustainable
development' "a buzzword in international development." 177 The norm
of sustainable development-using natural resources while preserving
enough for future generations to enjoy-has nearly been internalized by
Norway. 178
Sustainable development encourages environmental
policies to "anticipate, prevent, and attack the causes of environmental
degradation." 179 Norway has tried to show that a policy of sustainable
Even Norwegian
development can be applied to whaling. 180
environmental groups support Norwegian whaling, as Norway has
ensured that its whaling policy is consistent with the idea of sustainable
development. 181 Norway hopes that anti-whaling nations will soon
172. BBC Monitoring Europe, Sweden and Norway Establish Asian Environment
Fund, July 24, 2003, available at 2003 WL 60045084.
173. Svenska
Miljonatet,
Sveriges
Miljomal,
http://www.miljomal.nu/english/english.php (last updated Nov. 21, 2003) (last visited Jan.
11, 2004).
174. Id.
175. Kronsell, supra note 169; Duncan Liefferink and Mikael Skou Andersen,
Greening the EU: National Positions in the Run-up to the Amsterdam Treaty, 7 ENVTL. POL.
66, 74 (1998). In 1972, Sweden hosted the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment. Id. At the conference, Swedish policy makers presented their research on
acid rain, hoping to spark international cooperation on an issue that continued to plague
Sweden despite Sweden's attempts to combat acid rain internally. Id.
176. Grimsmo, supra note 136.
177. Ingebritsen, The Scandinavian Way, supra note 169.
178. Id.
179. Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/10 (1990).
180. See Alf Hakon Hoel, Norwegian Management of Living Marine Resources, at
http://odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/environment/03209 l-120004/index-dokOOO-b-na.html (Dec. 2000) (last visited Jan. 11, 2004); Caron, supra note 61, at 159-60.
181. Barrack Otieno, Whales, Elephants Divide Endangered Species Delegates, ENVTL.
NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 14, 2000, available at http://forests.org/archive/africa/wheldive.htm.
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realize the validity of sustainable development as a method for
conserving whales. 182
Thus, both Sweden and Norway have evolved into model countries
as a result of their global environmental contribution. 183 Nevertheless,
Norway could undermine its status as a model country by continuing to
hunt minke whales contrary to international sentiment. Likewise,
Norwegian whaling may harm Sweden's reputation as an environmental
model if Sweden supports Norway's whaling policy.
Nordic Cooperation orNordic Tension?

In addition to undermining environmental achievements, Norway's
unilateral decision to resume whaling may cause tension in the Nordic
region as a whole. The Nordic countries-Norway, Sweden, Iceland,
Denmark and Finland-"have more in common than most neighboring
countries." 184 Through the creation of two regional ministries and a
treaty, the region has sought to solidify the strong bond that exists
between them. 185 The Nordic countries all share an interest in
maintaining stability within the region and acting in concert with their
international foreign policies. 186 Over the years, these countries formed
economic partnerships to compete and prosper internationally and taken
similar stands on disarmament, development aid and human rights. 187
In 1952, the Nordic countries strengthened their cooperation by
forming the Nordic Council. 188 The Nordic Council works to promote

(last visited Jan. 11, 2004). A member of a prominent Norwegian environmental group
commented: "As long as [Norway] can harvest the surplus without reducing the stocks
significantly, we think whaling is a good thing." Otieno, supra note 181.
182. Jennifer Bailey and Brad McKay, Are Japanese Attitudes Toward Whaling
American-Bashing? A Response to Tanna and Hamazaki, ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN
REVIEW, Oct. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 15349858.
183. Most recently, Norway has become a model nation for other oil producing nations.
Bob Davis, Oslo Offers Iraq a Key Lesson in Revival; Once Tethered to Oil's Cycle of
Boom and Bust, Norway Revamped and Recovered, WALL ST. J. EUR., June 30, 2003, at Al.
Norway is unique as an oil producer because the government has segregated the oil business
from the Norwegian economy and has clearly stated that the people own the oil, as opposed
to one private entity claiming ownership rights. Id. Economists would like to recreate in Iraq
the Norwegian idea that profits should be shared with every citizen. Id. A senior analyst
stated: "If oil revenues have to be shared with everyone, you can't take the money, leave
everyone poor, and spend it on nuclear weapons." Id.
184. Three Nations ofNorthern Europe, supra note 127, at 37.
185. Id. at 47.
186. See id.
187. lngebritsen, The Scandinavian Way, supra note 169; Three Nations of Northern
Europe, supra note 127, at 47.
188. Three Nations of Northern Europe, supra note 127, at 47.
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inter-parliamentary cooperation and ensure cooperation in the
legislation of the Nordic countries. 189 In 1962, the Nordic countries
created and signed the Treaty of Cooperation. 190 Under the Treaty, the
Nordic countries "endeavor to maintain and further develop cooperation
between ... cultural, social and economic fields as well as in regard
to ... the protection of the environment." 191 Several articles of the
Treaty suggest that when issues of international commercial policy or
economic policy are present, the Nordic countries should consult one
another. 192 With the Nordic Council and the Treaty of Cooperation, the
amount of cooperation among Nordic countries remains unparalleled. 193
The close relationship shared by the Nordic countries implies that
the decisions of one country may positively or negatively impact the
other Nordic countries. For this reason, Nordic Ministers should
consult one another before making a decision that will impact the other
Nordic states. 194 Norway's unilateral decision to continue its whaling
practices, though receiving some support from Iceland, could strain the
relationship between Norway and the other Nordic countries.
Norway's nearest Nordic neighbors, Iceland and Sweden, each
have treated the whaling issue differently. Iceland, a pro-whaling
nation, did not follow Norway's lead in formally objecting to the IWC's
moratorium and discontinued whaling under pressure from anti-whaling
countries within the IWC. 195 After learning that the IWC had no
intention of revoking the moratorium, Iceland withdrew from the IWC
in 1992 and helped create the North Atlantic Marine Mammal
Commission (NAMMCO) with Norway and Denmark. 196 These
countries formed NAMMCO due to dissatisfaction with the IWC's
zero-catch limits and ineffective decision-making. 197 However, Norway
did not contribute to the legitimacy of NAMM CO as a replacement for

189. Nordic Council and Council of Ministers, History of the Nordic Region (May, 8,
2001), at http://www.norden.org/web/1-1/fakta/uk/1-1-4-nordens_hist.asp?lang=6. (last
visited Jan. 11, 2004).
190. DAVID DEGUISTINO, A READER IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 140 (London:
Longman 1996).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Barnes, supra note 3.
194. Tunander, supra note 165.
195. Sean D. Murphy, Blocking of Iceland's Effort to Join Whaling Convention, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 712 (2002).
196. Caron, supra note 61, at 163. Denmark helped create NAMMCO at the behest of
Greenland and the Faroe Islands, which have interests in whaling but cannot enter into
international treaties because they are under the sovereign rule of Denmark. Id.
197. Id.; see also Howton, supra note 1, at 181.
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the IWC as Iceland had hoped. Therefore, Iceland reapplied for
membership in the IWC in 2001. 198 Once Iceland was readmitted into
the IWC, the country announced that its plans to resume commercial
whaling. However, when the international community, especially the
United States, expressed extreme opposition to this decision, Iceland
elected to operate under a scientific exception of the ICRW and hunt
only 38 whales per year. 199 Britain and 23 other anti-whaling nations
criticized Iceland for inexcusably violating the spirit of the ICRW. 200
Because of Iceland's small size, the country has had to be careful not to
solicit retaliation and embargoes that could damage Iceland's
economy. 201 For this reason, Iceland may resent the fact that Norway
has nonchalantly disregarded international sentiment.
While Iceland has decidedly pro-whaling views, Sweden is caught
between the E.U. 's anti-whaling members and its cooperation with
Iceland and Norway. A majority of Swedish citizens are opposed to
whaling and, within the IWC, Sweden is considered a "pro-conservation
nation." 202 In 1995, Sweden announced an anti-whaling policy when
the Swedish Prime Minister sent a message to Norwegian Prime
Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland indicating that Sweden planned to take
a stronger position against Norway's whaling policy. 203 However,

198. Island Fick Hjalp Med Valjakt, DAGENS NYHETER, Oct. 15, 2002, available at
http://www.dn.se/Dnet/road/Classic/article/O/jsp/print.jps?&a-66731 (last visited Jan. 11,
2004) [hereinafter Island Fick Hjalp Med Valjakt].
199. Steve Connor, US Threatens Trade War as Iceland Resumes Whaling, Aug. 20,
2003, at http://lists.envirolink.org/pipermail/ar-news/Week-of-Mon-20030818/005168.html
(last visited Jan. 11, 2004). Iceland lowered its proposed catch limits from 250 to 38
following intense opposition from anti-whaling nations within the IWC. Steingrimur
Sigurgeirsson, Iceland Starts Whale Hunt Amid Protests, A.P. Online, Aug. 17, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 61744954. The Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries claims that the 38whale quota is a "minimalist approach" and shows that the nation is willing to "compromise
on whaling issues." Amanda Hodge, Iceland Ready to Resume Whaling, THE AUSTRALIAN,
Aug. 8, 2003, available at 2003 WL 61767168.
200. Colin Woodard, Iceland's Whale Hunting Makes Waves with Critics; Last Week
23 Countries Protested Iceland's Resumption of Whaling for 'Scientific Purposes,'
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 19, 2003, available at 2003 WL 5255597; see also Cod
Logic, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 22, 2003, available at 2003 WL 56711779. The United States
threatened to initiate a trade war with Iceland after Icelandic whalers broke the 17 year
moratorium to catch their first Minke whale in August, 2003. Connor, supra note 199.
201. See Iceland Kills First Whale Stirring International Outrage, U.S. NEWSWIRE,
Aug. 18, 2003, available at 2003 WL 55661280; U.S. Trade Sanctions over Whaling
Resumption, WMRC DAILY ANALYSIS, Aug. 7, 2003, available at 2003 WL 60321521.
202. Ingebritsen, Europeanization and Cultural Identity, supra note 57; Johanna
Matanich, A Treaty Comes of Age for the Ancient Ones: Implications of the Law of the Sea
for the Regulation of Whaling, 8 INT'L LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 37, 47 (1996).
203. Norwegian PM Concerned Over Swedish Hardline on Whaling, AGENCE FRANCEPRESSE, May 27, 1995, available at 1995 WL 7808482.
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Sweden's whaling policy seemed questionable when Sweden
accidentally cast the deciding vote in favor of readmitting Iceland into
the IWC in 2001. 204 Though the Swedish chairman argued he was
confused by the voting process and did not mean to vote for Iceland, at
least one environmental group questioned that explanation. 205 Sweden's
explanation is further weakened by the fact that barely five months
earlier, Iceland publicly criticized Sweden's lack of support during
Iceland's first attempt to rejoin the IWC. 206 While Sweden may not
have acted intentionally, this incident supports the notion that Sweden
continues to balance the interests of its pro-whaling Nordic neighbors
with the interests of the anti-whaling members of the E.U. and the
IWC.201
Thus, Norway's decision to continue whaling will cause tension
both between Norway and Sweden and between Norway and the Nordic
region as a whole.
However, because of the long tradition of
cooperation, the Nordic region will remain quiet and will neither
confront Norway nor publicly denounce Norway's whaling practice. 208
Since Norway purports to carry out its whaling activities in accordance
with sustainable development, the other Nordic countries should
understand that Norway's whaling policy is not meant to over-exploit
minke whales. 209 This tension will continue to exist as long as Norway
defies legitimate institutions such as the IWC and the E.U.
IV. THE FUTURE OF NORWEGIAN WHALING
While Norway's decision to continue whaling has enraged the
international community, the Norwegian government argues that
whaling is necessary to maintain the cultural identity of the small
Norwegian whaling communities and is not meant to over-exploit
minke whales. 210 Many Norwegians feel that the small, coastal
communities that have thrived on this tradition would cease to exist if

204. Island Fick Hjiilp Med Valjakt, supra note 198.
205. Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Sea Shepherd Comments on Whaling Issue,
at http://www.seashepherd.org (last visited Jan. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Sea Shepherd
Conservation Society].
206. See BBC Monitoring, Iceland Threatens Consequences for Lack of Swedish
Support in /WC, DAGENS NYHETER, May 23, 2002, available at 2002 WL 21781670.
207. Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, supra note 205.
208. See Grimsmo, supra note 136.
209. See id.
210. Joel R. Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1,
62-63 (2000).
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Norway discontinued its current whaling policy. 211 Norway based its
decision to resume whaling on evidence released by the IWC's
Scientific Committee, showing that the minke whale population could
sustain limited whaling. 212 This scientific evidence, however, will not
ameliorate the tension in the Nordic region, especially between Norway
and Sweden, who must balance anti- and pro-whaling interests in order
to appease both their Nordic and European neighbors. Despite the
tension in the region, Norway will continue to harvest whales as long as
whaling remains a part of Norwegian culture and identity, and
represents the right of self-determination. 213
While Norwegians refuse to renounce whaling as the source of
their national pride and culture, Norway has engaged in the promotion
of sustainable development as a means of conservation to help
legitimize its whaling practices. 214 A new form of eco-tourism, called
"Whale Safari," teaches the public about sustainable development as it
relates to Norwegian whaling. 215 A popular tourist attraction in Western
Norway, Whale Safari gives participants the opportunity to tour a
whaling vessel. 216 After the boat tour, participants are encouraged to try
whale meat at the local restaurants and buy t-shirts that display pictures
of Viking whalers and slogans such as "intelligent food for intelligent
people."217 While anti-whaling governments and non-governmental
organizations tend to politicize whaling, Whale Safari presents an
alternative view of whaling and hopes to offer insight into Norway's
Advocates of whale preservation,
sustainable use of whales. 218
including the IWC, suggest the use of whale-watching to replace the
whale-hunting industry. 219 Although whale-watching produces more
211. Paul, supra note 210, at 62.
212. See Lessoff, supra note 77, at 441.
213. J. Baird Callicott, Whaling in Sand County: A Dialectical Hunt for Land Ethical
Answers to Questions about the Morality of Norwegian Minke Whale Catching, 8 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 1, 2 (1997). "All people have the right to self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development." Hodges, supra note 1, at 317; Christine
Ingebritsen, The Politics of Whaling in Norway and Iceland, 85 SCANDINAVIAN REv. 9, 14
( 1997) [hereinafter Ingebritsen, Politics of Whaling].
214. See Ingebritsen, Politics of Whaling, supra note 213, at 14.
215. Id.
216. Id.;
Hvalsafari
[Whalesafari],
at
http://www.whalesafari.no/download/HvalsafariENG.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2004)
[hereinafter Whalesafari].
217. Ingebritsen, Politics of Whaling, supra note 213.
218. Id.; Whalesafari, supra note 216.
Whalewatching,
219. International
Whaling
Commission,
http://www.iwcoffice.org/Catches.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2004).
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money than harvesting whales, Norway will not replace whaling, a
symbol of its sovereignty and identity, with whale-watching. 220
Norway must now focus on a bigger issue: whether or not it will
join the E.U. Recently, Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne
Bondevik announced that Norway will likely hold another vote on E.U.
membership by the year 2010. 221 If Norway accepts membership, the
nation would acquire greater decision-making power and could assist
Sweden in exerting pressure on the E.U. to adopt more extensive
environmental policies. 222 However, Norway would be required to reconsider its whaling policy. E.U. member nations have not changed
their views on whaling since Norway's last attempt to join the E.U. in
1994.223 The majority ofE.U. members continue to express disapproval
of whaling and agree that the environment should be regulated
collectively. 224 Unless Norway can successfully bargain with the E.U.
to retain the Norwegian whaling tradition, Norway may face similar
outcomes as those of its 1972 and 1994 referendums.
V.

CONCLUSION

Norway continues to prove that it will withstand threats and
criticism in order to maintain Norwegian cultural identity and
sovereignty.
The resumption of Norway's whaling practices
undermines the credibility of the IWC as a regulatory regime; however,
Norway's whaling does not undermine the purpose of the ICRW, which
is to regulate whaling and preserve whales for future generations of
whalers. Furthermore, Norwegian minke whaling does not violate
international law or custom, and is consistent with international treaties.
Under international law, Norway can continue whaling, but must do so
at the expense of a better relationship with Europe and the Nordic
region. Norway has remained isolated from the rest of Europe, which
negatively affects the Nordic members of the E.U. If Norway became a
member, the Nordic region could vote together and play a larger role in

220. James Brooke, Watching for Whales Is Outpacing Hunting Them, SEATTLE TIMES,
Aug. 19, 2001, at A2.
221. Norge Rostar om EU fore 2010, DAGENS NYHETER, Dec. 13, 2002, available at
http://www.dn.se (last visited Jan. 11, 2004).
222. See Wexley, supra note 158, at 229.
223. Ingebritsen, Europeanization and Cultural Identity, supra note 56. In fact, when
Portugal entered into negotiations with the European Union, the country had to forgo
harvesting whales. Id. Norway would suffer from the same fate if it chose to join the
European Union. Id.
224. Id.

Published by SURFACE, 2004

27

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 31, No. 1 [2004], Art. 9

148

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vo 1. 3 1: 121

European affairs. 225
Arguably, Norway would be better off by abstaining from whaling
until the IWC is convinced that the minke whale population can sustain
whaling. However, it is unlikely that the IWC will ever reach that
conclusion. At the most recent annual meeting of the IWC, member
nations not only reaffirmed their commitment to uphold the
moratorium, but a majority voted in favor of creating a Conservation
Committee to make recommendations to the IWC in furtherance of
whale preservation. 226 Notably, at the conclusion of the IWC meeting,
the Swedish chairman of the IWC, Bo Fernholm, criticized the IWC for
implementing a Conservation Committee rather than working toward a
"balance between conservation and management." 227
If Norway continues to whale under this balance as Sweden
suggests and regulates the whaling industry based on the idea of
sustainable development, Norway will eventually prove to the world
that its whaling practices are not meant to over-exploit whales. For a
territorially small nation, Norway has exhibited admirable strength in
standing up to international opposition. Where other countries have
relinquished traditions to integrate into Europe, Norway has fought hard
to maintain its cultural identity. However, as long as Norway continues
to regulate whaling consistent with the idea of sustainable development
and continues to pursue stringent environmental policies, Norway
should continue its whaling tradition. Eventually, the international
community will realize minke whales are thriving despite Norway's
whaling policy. This will legitimize Norwegian whaling, thereby easing
the tension in the Nordic region.

225. Wexley, supra note 158, at 229.
(2003),
226. International
Whaling
Commission,
Final
Press
Release,
www.iwcoffice.org/FinalPressRelease2003.htm. (last visited Jan. 11, 2004).
227. Geir Moulson, Global Whaling Commission Votes to Strengthen Commitment to
Conservation, THE CANADIAN PRESS, June 16, 2003, available at 2003 WL 57077604.
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